Barbara Montero
According to David Chalmers (1996, 2002, 2009) the
conceivability argument against physicalism is, by and large, successful. In outline, this argument asks us to first
conceive of a world that, although just like ours at the level of fundamental
physics, lacks consciousness. It goes on
to claim that a world matching this conception is possible and concludes that
consciousness is not physical. Most accept
that if it is possible for there to be a world that duplicates the fundamental
properties of physics without duplicating consciousness, then consciousness is
not physical. And many accept that we can in some sense conceive of such
worlds. The controversial part of the argument is the move from conceivability
to possibility. Yet, according to
Chalmers, when we are very careful about what is to count as conceivability,
this move also is valid. Physicalism
about the mind, then, says Chalmers, must be rejected.
Or rather, it must almost be
rejected. This qualification arises because
“Russellian monism,” characterized by Chalmers (2002, p. 265) as the view that
“consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental
physical entities” falls through a loophole in antiphysicalist conceivability
arguments. For it may be, according to
Chalmers, that when we conceive of the fundamental physical world we fail to
conceive of its intrinsic properties. Yet if Russellian monism is true,
consciousness depends on these intrinsic properties, and because of this a
world that duplicates of our fundamental physics without duplicating these
properties may be a world without consciousness. The most, then, that even the best
conceivability arguments can conclude, Chalmers tells us, is either physicalism
is false or Russellian monism is true (2009).
Is this good news for the
physicalist? One might think so, but not
Chalmers. Although he thinks that
Russellian monism “may ultimately provide the best integration of the physical
and the phenomenal within the natural world” and that “there appears to be no
strong reasons to reject the view,” he argues that it “has much in common with property dualism,
and that many physicalists will want to reject [it]” (2009). He suggests that, “while the view arguably
fits the letter of materialism, it shares
the spirit of antimaterialism” (2002, p. 265.).
The goal of this paper is to show
that the gap in the current antiphysicalist arguments is more significant than
Chalmers has made it out to be since there is a variation of Russellian monism,
what I refer to as “Russellian physicalism,” that falls through the loophole
yet is fully physicalistic.
Of course, physicalists who never saw
conceivability arguments as bad news in the first place may respond to this
news rather nonchalantly. As they see things, not even the most careful type of
conceivability can result in knowledge of (or even very good evidence for) the
possibility of worlds that duplicate our physics, yet lack consciousness (e.g.
Dennett 1995). But, still, such
physicalists should take heed of Russellian physicalism since even if the
conceivability of “zombie worlds,” as they are sometimes called, is not a guide
to their possibility, they may be possible nonetheless. Or at least, to show that they are not
possible is a great deal more difficult than to show that conceivability
provides neither knowledge of nor good evidence for them. Yet Russellian physicalism can be
consistently maintained, even if some of the physicalist’s worst zombie riddled
nightmares depict a possibility.
I shall begin with a description of
Russellian monism and go on to explain why this view escapes the
antiphysicalist arguments. I then argue that although Russellian monism may be
a borderline case of physicalism, a small revision turns it into Russellian physicalism,
which is physicalistic through and through.
In preview, I argue that the spirit of antimaterialism is captured by
the idea that mentality received special consideration in the creation of the
universe and since Russellian physicalism takes the fundamental grounds of
everything to be neither mental nor specifically for the purpose of generating
mentality it does not bestow a place of prominence to the mental.
As Chalmers tells us, Russellian monism takes its inspiration from Bertrand Russell’s view that fundamental physics tells us only about the structure of the world, about the abstract relations between things but not about the things themselves. In Chalmers’ words, “current physics characterizes its underlying properties (such as mass and charge) in terms of abstract structures and relations, but it leaves open their intrinsic natures”(2002, p. 259). From physics we learn how mass behaves—we learn that a body with greater mass has more inertia, that the mass of a body does not vary with changes in gravity and so forth—but not what mass is apart from a set of behaviors. From physics we learn that opposite charges attract each other, that like charges repel, that the net charge of any isolated system never varies, but we do not learn what charge is, itself, apart from what it does. Form physics we come to understand the nomological or causal role of properties, but not the nature of properties themselves. Russell (1959/1995) puts the view thus: “All that physics gives us is certain equations giving abstract properties of their changes. But as to what it is that changes, and what it changes from and to—as to this, physics is silent” (p. 13). Or as Galileo famously said, the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics.
According to
the Russellian monist, however, nature itself consists of more than abstract
relations described mathematically; for in addition to the relations, there are
the things that stand in relation to each other. Besides laws, says the Russellian
monist, there is something for the laws to describe. It is difficult to say
much about these first order properties, the properties of nature itself since
it is not just in physicists, but in all arenas that we explain things in terms
of their relations to other things. When
we explain things we explain what things do, how they affect us, and how they
are related to other things. If you ask
me what, say, a cantelever bridge is, I will tell you that it is a bridge that
juts out on one side of a support. As opposed to a suspension bridge, or a beam
bridge, it would not fall down if you were to cut it in half, and so on. But although the properties that concern the
Russellian do something—according to the Russellian they form the determination
base for consciousness— there is more to them than what they do. They not only do something, they also are
something.
But what are they?[1] Chalmers refers to them as “the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities” as well as the “the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.” However, as I see it, what is significant for the Russellian monist is that there is some aspect of the fundamental world, some aspect of the fundamental properties given to us by physics that grounds consciousness, yet about which physics is silent (perhaps not permanently but for the foreseeable future). So to highlight this, let me call the properties of the fundamental world, which, according to the Russellian, are not revealed by physics yet ground consciousness, “inscrutables.” Although Chalmers finds some problems with Russellian monism, which I will address later, he seems to accept the Russellian picture of physics and the idea that consciousness could be determined (in part) by inscrutables. But, as I shall go on to argue, once he does this, he has admitted that physicalism, both letter and spirit, might be true.[2]
Given that Russellian monism avoids the antiphysicalist conceivability argument, one might wonder why Chalmers, one of philosophy’s most eminent antiphysicalists, remains undaunted. The reason is that as Chalmers sees it Russellian monism isn’t really physicalism because it, “acknowledges phenomenal or protophenomenal properties as ontologically basic” (2002, p. 265).
If inscrutables are themselves phenomenal, Russellian monism turns into a kind of panpsychism, imbuing the fundamental entities of physics with mentality. This, according to Chalmers, results in a position that is at least in spirit antiphysicalist.[3] And I agree. But the protophenomenal version of the view, as it does not posit that the fundamental entities are imbued with mentality, does not result in panpsychism. So why should this view be unacceptable to physicalists?
Chalmers reasons that even in its protophenomenal form the view, “can be seen as a sort of dualism” since it 1) acknowledges “protophenomenal properties as ontologically fundamental, and 2) it retains an underlying duality between structural-dispositional properties (those directly characterized in physical theory) and intrinsic protophenomenal properties (those responsible for consciousness” (2002, p. 265). Moreover, he claims that 3) the protophenomenal version of the view retains some of the “strangeness” of the phenomenal version of the view since “it seems that any properties responsible for constituting consciousness must be strange and unusual properties, of a sort that we might not expect to find in microphysical reality” (2002, p. 266).
I think that these last two points can be addressed rather quickly. I do not see dualism, in the sense that there are two fundamentally different sorts of substances or properties, as necessarily antiphysicalistic. If, say, dark matter turned out to be composed of something entirely different from ordinary matter, there would be two fundamentally different sorts of things, but this, I would think, should not pose a counterexample to physicalism. And I think that a physicalist should not reject a view merely because it posits strange and unusual properties of a sort that we would not expect to find in microphysical reality; each new revolution in physics itself brings with it such properties yet these revolutions have not overturned physicalism. The fist point, however, is rather more vexing.
Does
Russellian monism posit protophenomenal properties? This depends on what is to count as
“protophenomenal.” If the
protophenomenal is just whatever it is that serves as a dependence base for the
phenomenal, then certainly the view does posit such properties. But all forms of non-reductive physicalism
hold that consciousness is ultimately determined by nonconscious properties.[4] On the other hand if the protophenomenal is
supposed to be tainted with the phenomenal, then this is antiphysicalistic, but
such a position is more in line with the panpsychist version of the view than
the protophenomenal version.
If,
however, Russellian monism posits not only nonconscious properties that form
the dependence base for consciousness but also posits that the properties that
determine consciousness have no other role than that of determining
consciousness, Chalmers suspicions would be better grounded. These properties would be protophenomenal
because they specifically ground the phenomenal. Typical non-reductive
physicalist views are not this like this. For the typical nonreductivist, the
fundamental physical world is the dependence base for everything including
consciousness. But the Russellian
monist, understood in this way, sees the fundamental properties of physics as
the dependence base for rocks, trees, chairs, and tables, indeed, everything
except for consciousness and sees inscrutables (perhaps combined with the
properties of physics) as forming the dependence base for consciousness. Does this make the view physicalististically
suspect?[5]
As I see it, the basic schism between physicalists and antiphysicalists concerns whether human beings (and perhaps other animals) have a special place in the world. If mental phenomena were fundamental, being, for example, part of the original brew that was set in motion in the big bang or being added as something extra along the way, human beings would have a place of prominence in the world. This would hint at a world created with us in mind; it would suggest that when God created the world, she also created minds. When we understand the fundamental physical as excluding mentality, we go some way towards capturing this schism: physicalists, in claiming that the world, at its most fundamental level, is entirely nonmental see God as putting together the fundamental physical properties and entities, while antiphysicalists in claiming that mentality is a fundamental feature of the world, see that she thought of creating creatures with minds as well.[6] Russellian monism rejects mentality at the ground level and so would seem to be aligned with the physicalist sentiment. But since it acknowledges that there are properties whose sole role is grounding consciousness doesn’t it hint at some special consideration for consciousness? Perhaps physicalism not only requires that all fundamental properties are not conscious but also that they are not for the sole purpose of grounding consciousness. Is Russellian monism, physicalism manqué after all?
I think that when we think of it as a view that posits inscrutables that have the sole purpose of grounding consciousness the answer is not entirely clear. Perhaps if consciousness were merely the result of, say, inscrutables reaching a threshold of complexity, there would seem to be nothing to worry the physicalist. Still, Russellian monism, understood in this way, may best thought of as a borderline case of physicalism. But Russellian monism need not be understood as positing specifically consciousness grounding inscrutables. That is, it need not be understood as protopsychic. Rather, the Russellian can posit that inscrutables form the dependence base for the entire concrete world, only a very small portion of which is mental. The Russellian view of physics leaves us with a highly abstract picture of the world: “Our knowledge of the physical world [i.e. the world described by physics]” Russell tells us, “is only abstract and mathematical.” Yet, arguably, the world is more than equations; arguably, God, as it were, is not only a pure mathematician, but an applied one as well. And on this way of understanding the Russellian view, inscrutables ground the applications.
If inscrutables are in this way the substance of the world, if they are, to use Stephen Hawking’s words, what “breathes fire into the equations [of any possible grad unified theory of physics] and makes a universe for them to describe," there is nothing particularly protopsychic about them and a world with them should be perfectly acceptable to a physicalist. This is the view, then, that I think is appropriately deemed “Russellian physicalism.”
Russellian physicalism is consistent with the failure of upward determination since it holds that duplicating just the fundamental physics of our world, which is entirely structural, duplicates only more structure and not consciousness. If Russellian physicalism were true, a world that duplicates our fundamental physics yet lacks consciousness would either have inscrutables that differ from those in our world and do not ground consciousness or, perhaps, no inscrutables at all.[7] Russellian physicalism therefore captures the spirit of physicalism yet escapes the conceivability argument against physicalism.
But is Russellian physicalism consistent with the possibility of zombie worlds? If we equate zombie worlds, as I did earlier, with worlds that duplicate our physics yet lack consciousness, we have just seen that the answer is “yes. But sometimes zombie worlds are thought of as not just duplicating the fundamental properties of physics, but as duplicating everything about our world save for consciousness. Russellian physicalism is not consistent with zombie worlds as such and neither is Russellian monism (of the panprotopsychic form) since both views hold that a world that duplicates everything but consciousness would duplicate inscrutables and that once we duplicate inscrutables consciousness comes along for free. However, the Russellian monist and physicalist can explain why we might think that such worlds are possible. According to the Russellian monist, when we think that there could be a world just like our world but without consciousness, we are actually imagining a world just like ours yet without protopsychic-inscrutables. If Russellian monism were true, such a world would be possible. And the Russellian physicalist concurs: when we imagine the possibility of worlds that duplicate everything but consciousness, we are imagining a Russellian monist world without inscrutables. If Russellian physicalism were true, such a world would be possible.
So it seems
that Chalmers’ reasons for why we should think that Russellian monism is
antimaterialistic in spirit are either not forceful, as with the accusation
that it is a form of dualism and strange or do not apply to Russellian
physicalism, as with the accusation that it posits protophenomenal
properties. The view I have presented
does not posit protophenomenal properties in the sense of properties that have
the sole purpose of grounding consciousness.
But rather posits that consciousness is grounded in the same sort of
nonmental properties that ground rocks, tables, robots and chairs. As such, the view is not only in name, but
also in spirit physicalistic.
IV But what of the Hard
Problem?
But the question of how inscrutables ground consciousness remains. Part of the motivation to accept a Russellian view is that in its panpsychist form, it is thought to solve, or at least go a long way toward solving what Chalmers refers to as “the hard problem of consciousness,” that is, the problem of explaining how it is possible for creatures like us to be conscious.[8]
Russellian physicalism, however, does not have the advantage of alleviating the hard problem. Rather, it claims that the world is such that we cannot, at least currently, see the solution, for inscrutables are fundamental properties yet physics, which is our only insight into the fundamental nature of the world, is blind to them. As such, it leaves the explanatory gap wide open.
But why should we accept the view at all? My aim in this paper has been, not to convince you that Russellian physicalism is true, but rather to show that there is version of physicalism that is consistent with the central antiphysicalist intuition that the failure of upward determination is possible. But, in fact, if you accept the antiphysicalist intuition yet also think that physicalism of one sort or another must be true, I have also presented an argument for the view since Russellian physicalism is, among the current panoply of solutions to the mind-body problem, the only view that allows you to do both.
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McGinn, C. (1989), "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" Mind.
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[1] Chalmers and others refer to them as the “intrinsic
properties of fundamental physical entities” (Chalmers 2002, p. 265). I not
sure that this helps understand them any better. What is an intrinsic
property? Many understand the notion along
Lewisian lines whereby “an intrinsic
property of a” is a property a would have whether or not anything
else besides a existed (Langton and Lewis, 1998). But if this is correct, then it seems that
physics can tell us about intrinsic properties.
For example, a positively charged particle has the property of being
such that if it were in a world with physical laws x, y, and z, (where x, y,
and z describe the laws of our world) and with entities and properties u, v, w
(where u, v and w describe the other entities and properties of our), it would
be attracted to a negatively charged particle. This property counts as
intrinsic yet, arguably, is revealed by physics.
Chalmers tells us, however, that by “intrinsic properties” he means “the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.” Roughly, when we learn of an object’s dispositional properties we learn about what an object will do in various circumstances. For example, when we find out that a sugar cube is soluble, we learn that it has the property of being such that if it were placed in water (of a certain temperature for a certain amount of time) it would dissolve. And in due deference to Quine, who thought that dispositional terms are not part of a mature science, it may be, as Simon Blackburn puts it, that “science finds only dispositions all the way down.”
But what of the categorical properties, the properties that the Russellian monist thinks form the dependence base for experience? Categorical properties ground dispositional properties, yet consciousness, itself, according to the Russellian is not a dispositional property. I suppose the idea is supposed to be that the categorical properties of the fundamental dispositional properties of physics ground consciousness, which, then, grounds certain dispositions. But I am also hesitant to rely on the categorical/dispositional distinction to clarify the Russellian position since, as far as I can tell, categorical properties, though thought of as nondispositional, just seem to be dispositional properties at a lower level. For example, the categorical grounds of a sugar cube’s solubility are said to be it’s molecular structure but its molecular structure is dispositional, as it is, for example, disposed to ground the sugar cube’s disposition to dissolve. And this disposition is revealed by science.[1]
Of
course, Russellian monists are concerned with what they see as the fundamental
categorical grounds of the dispositions of fundamental particles and forces.
Why is it, for example, that a muon decays at the rate that it does? Physics
does not say anything about this. However, even here, if “categorical” is
supposed to imply not dispositional, it is not clear that an answer to this
questions would refer to categorical properties since, if there is an answer to
this question, the answer will cite a dispositional property, for whatever it
is that makes muons decay at the rate that they do, is disposed to make
them decay at this rate.
If we think of the fundamental properties of physics as both the “structurals” and the inscrutables, however, Russellian monism still wiggles through the antiphysicalist conceivability argument by explaining away the intuition that the failure of upward determination seems possible. It may seem to us that we can conceive of a world duplicating our physics yet lacking consciousness, but this, the Russellian monist would now say, is because we do not imagine the full story of fundamental physics; if we did (perhaps per impossible) we would see that such a world would contain consciousness as well.
How a Russellian avoids the antiphysicalist arguments obviously also depends on how we understand the position. All Russellian monists think that structure alone does not suffice for consciousness. And all accept that consciousness exists and its existence is determined, at least in part, by what I am calling “inscrutables.” But Russellians can differ as to how they understand the relation between inscrutables and the structural properties of physics. A Russellian can think of the fundamental properties of physics as either requiring inscrutables or not requiring them. And Russellian monism is consistent with the possibility of worlds that duplicate our physics (as thought of as duplicating only the structural properties) yet lack consciousness only if physics does not require consciousness-generating inscrutables. A Russellian who holds that the structural properties of physics require consciousness grounding inscrutables can, however, explain away the intuition: when we think we can conceive of world duplicating our physics without consciousness, she will say, we are not imagining everything that follows from duplicating our physics. The failure of upward determination of consciousness by physics is conceivable, she will say, only in the sense that the mathematical conjecture that P=NP would be conceivable even if P ≠ NP. (In Chalmers’ way of thinking of this, the failure of upward determination is conceivable because we are conceiving of only of the primary intention of the world of physics.)
Since in each case the Russellian has a response to the conceivability argument, nothing of much substance turns on these distinctions. For simplicity then, by “the fundamental physical properties,” I shall mean just the structural properties of fundamental physics, and I shall assume that these properties do not require consciousness-generating inscrutables.
[3] (Can panpsychism be a type
of physicalism? Some think it can, and
Chalmers is of course right that it can be called “physicalism.” For example,
if one takes what accepts what Daniel Stojar (2001) refers to as “the
object-based conception” of the physical, if everything is made out of the sort
of stuff that constituted paradigmatic physical objects, such as trees and
rocks, then physicalism could be true even if panpsychism were true. I think
this is confusing use of the term “physical,” but that is another matter. What is at stake here is not the terminology
of physicalism, but its spirit. Chalmers
thinks that how we use the term “physical” is merely terminological. And in a sense this is correct as one can
always merely stipulate how to use the term. But he also thinks that there is
the spirit of physicalism. And this,
presumably, isn’t merely terminological.
Yet if there is a spirit of physicalism, wouldn’t the best terminology
be the terminology that matches that spirit.)
Some, however, claim that the Russellian view must be, or at least is best thought of as a version of panpsychism. In addressing the Russellian view, Daniel Stojar (2006) argues against this. He tells us that people have thought that Russellian monism entails or at least suggests panpsychism because we derive our concept of categoricity from phenomenal concepts. He then goes on to argue, that even if this is so, it doesn’t follow that categorical properties are phenomenal. Citing Kripke’s example, he says that one might acquire the concept of a duck from seeing ducks in central park, but our concept of a duck need not be limited only ducks in central park. Moreover, Stoljar argues, it is unclear that we do derive our idea of categoricity from phenomenality. If a categorical property just is, as he assumes, “a nondispositoinal property on which dispositional properties supervene,” then the notion of categoricity does not suggest phenomenality (2006, p. 119). This seems correct to me and would seem to apply to the concept of “inscrutablility” just as well as categoricity.
[4] An exception would arise for a “physicalism”
that is also a form of panpsychism.
[5] Chalmers is no doubt correct
to say that Russellian monism is a view that most physicalists would reject,
but this is most likely simply because most physicalists accept other responses
to the conceivability argument (for example, they may think that a clear
understanding of the properties of physics would show that consciousness is
determined by the properties of physics or they may think that conceivability
is not a guide to possibility). But
would these same physicalists say that physicalism is false if it were somehow
shown that Russellian monism is true?
[6] For expressions of this
understanding of the physical see, for example, Levine (2001), Montero (2001),
and Stoljar (2006).
[7] Is an entirely abstract
world possible? I am not sure, but some
think it is not only possible but actual.
See, for example, Laydyman et. al. (2007).
[8] Some think that not even panpsychism would help alleviate the hard problem. For it seems, as Ned Block (1980) has argued, that even if what realized our protons, electrons and other elementary particles were a race of incredibly small humanlike creatures flying around in spaceships, we would still not see how consciousness could arise, even though consciousness would be part of the fabric of our elementary particles. As Daniel Stoljar (2006) puts it, “it seems just as hard to see how one experiential truth can entail another as it is to see how a nonexperiential truth can entail an experiential truth” (p. 120). But I am not sure that this is so. Block’s argument does indicate that it is just as difficult to understand how a person who was composed of little people darting around in spaceships could be conscious as it is to understand how something entirely nonmental could be conscious. But this is because when we think of human beings we think of individual conscious experiences that do not combine to make unified group consciousness. It is something like arguing that carbon dioxide emissions are irrelevant to the explanation of the greenhouse effect because you can imagine a world whose protons were actually miniscule earth like structures creating carbon dioxide emissions in their own atmospheres. Yet the workings of such protons would not help explain the greenhouse effect. But, arguably, carbon dioxide emissions do.
To
be sure, the analogy is not exact since panpsychism is a view that is far less
well understood than the theory that carbon dioxide emissions are relevant to
the greenhouse effect. Of particular significance, one would like to know what
it means to be mental at the subatomic level and how it is that such mentality
could combine to form the sort of unified conscious life that we all
experience. Nonetheless panpsychism
seems to alleviate some of the burden of the hard problem. If, say, my table were composed of tiny
irreducible solid hard block like structures, explaining why, say, my table is
hard, would be easier than explaining what makes it hard given that it is
composed mainly of empty space. There would still be some explaining to do—the
blocks just fit together in such and such a pattern—but the task would be
easier.